The attribution of international responsibility to a State for conduct of private individuals within the territory of another State by Álvarez Ortega, Elena Laura
 
 
 
 
  
InDret 
REVISTA PARA EL    WWW. INDRET.COM 
ANÁLISIS DEL DERECHO 
 
BARCELONA, ENERO 2015 
The attribution of international 
responsibility to a State for conduct 
of private individuals within the 
territory of another State 
 
 
 
 
Elena Laura Álvarez Ortega 
Trabajo de Final de Grado en Derecho (Curso 2013-2014) 
Facultad de Derecho 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra 
 
InDret   1/2015                                                                                                                   Elena Laura Álvarez Ortega 
 
 
Abstract1
 
 
The issue of the attribution of international responsibility to States for conduct of a group of individuals within 
the territory of another State has become a question of control. International jurisprudence has addressed this 
question by advancing several different control tests that allegedly better resolve the attribution question. The 
ICJ put forward two control tests in the Nicaragua case, the so-called strict control or agency test and the 
effective control test. The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY found it unpersuasive and used instead what named 
the overall control test. Moreover, the ECtHR has developed yet another test: the effective overall control test. 
These control tests will be set out explaining the different rationales that argue for and against their adoption 
and it will be seen that they show a tension between the need for what has been called “real accountability” of 
States and the attribution of responsibility to States only for their own conduct. It will be argued that while 
accountability is an important purpose, especially when dealing with international humanitarian law, it is 
necessary to ensure that States are only held responsible for conduct with which there is a sufficient close link 
so as to be considered its own. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
This paper deals with the attribution to States of international responsibility for the conduct of 
private individuals within the territory of another State. The reason for choosing this issue as the 
subject of my paper is that, as some scholars have pointed out, this has become a paradigmatic 
instance of fragmentation in public international law2. Different international tribunals have 
advanced their own control tests in order to answer the question of attribution to a State of the 
conduct of private individuals in the territory of another State. Hence, this is an issue that keeps 
evolving as different cases reach the tribunals and which has an important practical dimension in a 
globalised world in which States have many different ways to influence groups placed in distant 
territories. The most relevant point is appreciating how the different control tests advanced by the 
international tribunals respond to different principles that underlie the law of State responsibility: 
they show a tension between the will of preventing States avoiding responsibility by acting through 
non-official individuals and the principle of holding States responsible only for their own conduct. 
However, since States are legal entities always need to act through persons and the determination of 
when someone’s conduct can be regarded as an act of the State is a normative decision3
 
 which needs 
to take into account the principles that lie behind this area of public international law.  
For the writing of this paper I read the leading cases of the different international tribunals which 
have advanced their own tests, set out the main lines of their reasoning and elaborated on the 
rationales for putting forward one test or another. Later I contrasted them and, taking into account 
the principles for favouring each and some scholars opinions about them, I share my view on which 
test should be preferred. I defend that the strict control test and the effective control test put forward by 
the ICJ are to be preferred since are the ones which best guarantee that a State is only held 
responsible for acts with which there is enough connection as to be considered their own. Moreover, 
I consider this does not involve allowing States avoiding responsibility by acting through non-
officials because, even if attribution of a private group’s conduct is denied, the State can still be held 
accountable for its own conduct in relation to the group. 
 
 
2. The attribution of international responsibility to a State   
  
This essay deals specifically with the attribution to States of international responsibility for the 
conduct of private individuals within the territory of another State. This issue has turned into a 
question of control4
                                                        
2 In this sense see: TALMON (2009) p. 496: “the test of control of authorities and military forces of secessionist entities 
has become perhaps the most cited examples of “the fragmentation of international law”. 
 with the International Court of Justice (hereafter, ICJ), the International Tribunal 
 
3 See CRAWFORD (2002) p. 83. 
4 See TALMON (2009) p. 496: “the question of whether or not an act of a secessionist enity can be attributed to an 
outside power thus becomes a question of how one defines “control”. 
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for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia (hereafter, ICTY) and the European Court of 
Human Rights (hereafter, ECtHR) advancing different control tests responding to different levels of 
stringency in order to solve the attribution issue of the conduct to the State.  
 
First of all, it is important to recall that the reference text in this area is the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001)5. The 
International Law Commission (hereinafter, ILC) recommended the General Assembly of the United 
Nations to take note of the Articles- the drafting of which had lasted for forty years- and to annex 
them in a General Assembly Resolution, with the possibility of later converting them into a 
convention. This second step has not been taken and no convention has been adopted. Therefore, the 
ILC Articles are not binding law as such but, despite their nature, they are an essential piece in the 
area of State responsibility for internationally wrongful acts and to a large extent they codify 
international law6
 
. 
 
2.1 The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
 
The ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, as their own name 
expresses, deal only with the international responsibility of States. They do not regulate the 
international responsibility of international organisations, as article 57 makes clear7 or other entities 
different that States. Moreover, they do not affect or replace individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of the State, as article 58 points out. These articles 
only deal with the international responsibility of a State that flows from an internationally wrongful 
act and not from permitted activities which have potentially dangerous consequences in case of 
accident8
 
. 
To adequately define the scope of the ILC Articles it is important to stress that these articles are 
secondary rules in so far as they only conform a general set of rules that regulates the conditions for 
international responsibility to arise, its content and consequences but do not rule on when a specific 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
5 The International Law Commission’s Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (2001) will be 
subsequently referred merely as the “ILC Articles”. 
 
6 See TALMON (2009) pg. 495: claims that the ILC Articles “are widely considered to reflect customary international 
law”. 
 
7 The international responsibility of international organisations is specifically dealt with by the ILC Draft Articles on  
the Responsibility of International Organisations (2009). 
 
8 On this topic, it is rellevant to notice the ILC Draft Principles on the allocation of loss in the case of transboundary harm 
arising out of hazardous activities (2006). 
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obligation binding on a State has been violated- this is a matter for the primary rules as substantive 
rules. They set a frame of secondary rules which apply in case of any breach of an international 
obligation by a State, without ruling on the characteristics or substance of that primary obligation 
which is violated. In Crawford’s words: “the law relating to the content and the duration of 
substantive State obligations is as determined by primary rules. The law of State responsibility as 
articulated in the Draft Articles provides the framework – those rules, denominated –secondary–, 
which indicate the consequences of a breach of an applicable primary obligation”9
 
. 
The ILC Articles are structured into Four Parts. Part One deals with the notion of Internationally 
Wrongful Act of a State. Part Two deals with the Content of International Responsibility of a State. 
Part Three deals with the Implementation of the International Responsibility of a State, and Part Four 
sets out some General Provisions. This essay deals with the topic of attribution and therefore it will 
focus on Part One, Chapter II, which sets out the rules for the Attribution of Conduct to a State. 
However, a brief reference will be now made to the General Principles of Chapter I, so as to have a 
general view of the notion of “internationally wrongful act”, the elements it comprises and the 
consequences it generates.  
 
Article 1 sets out the essential principle that “every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the 
international responsibility of that State”. An internationally wrongful act is an expression that 
covers both actions and omissions and the wrongfulness or otherwise of such conduct is to be judged 
according to the requirements of the allegedly violated obligation. The production of a wrongful act 
entails the emergence of a new set of legal relations which are referred to as “international 
responsibility”. These relations may be between the responsible State and one or several injured 
States, or the international community as a whole, depending on the nature of the breached 
obligation. The content of this new set of legal relations is the object of regulation by these articles.  
 
Article 2 sets out the two elements of an internationally wrongful act: (a) the conduct (action or 
omission) which is attributable to the State under international law and (b) constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State. The issue of attribution is a “necessarily normative operation”10 
since the State cannot act by itself and attribution consists on considering certain conduct as 
belonging to the State. The rules of attribution will be set out in the next section but now it is 
important to point out that while certain scholars have identified attribution with a “subjective” 
element, the ILC Articles do not use this contrast between subjective and objective elements. 
Crawford has pointed out that “whether responsibility is “objective” or “subjective” in this sense 
depends on the circumstances, including the content of the primary obligation in question. The 
articles lay down no general rule in that regard”11
                                                        
9 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 16. 
. It is also relevant to recall that the State as a 
 
10 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 83. 
 
11 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 82. 
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subject of international law is treated as a unity and is a single subject of attribution of conduct, 
regardless of who would be the responsible organ under internal law. The LaGrand case made this 
point clear, with the ICJ asserting the international responsibility of the United States for an act 
which was within the competence of the Governor of Arizona. 
 
Article 3 makes clear that the characterisation of an act as internationally wrongful is a question for 
international law which cannot be affected by the characterisation as lawful under the internal law of 
the State. This principle is well-established and has been repeatedly asserted in many judicial and 
arbitral procedures. Internal law may be relevant for that determination but “in such cases it is 
international law which determines the scope and limits of any reference to internal law”12
 
. 
 
2.2 The issue of Attribution of Conduct to a State: articles 4 to 11 
 
The focus will now be placed on analysing the rules of attribution, which are set out in articles 4 to 
11. These are taken to “reflect existing customary international law”13. Attribution, as mentioned 
above, is a normative operation, which means that it responds to the application of rules which 
determine when there is a sufficiently close link between a certain conduct and a State so as to 
consider that conduct as an “act of the State”. These rules respond to normative criteria and not 
merely to a factual relation, since the State as a legal person cannot act by itself but through human 
beings, and it is for international law to determine when an act can or cannot be attributed to a State: 
“the attribution of conduct to the State as a subject of international law is based on criteria 
determined by international law and not on the mere recognition of a link of factual causality”14. 
Articles 4 to 11 are taken to be a numerus clausus and, except in cases where a lex especialis is 
applicable (as foreseen in Article 55) attribution of conduct to a State can only be based on one (or 
several) of the grounds of Part One, Chapter II15
 
. 
Article 4 establishes a basic rule of attribution of conduct of any of its organs to the State. Here the 
unity principle applies and it is irrelevant the level or the functions that the organ has. It includes all 
organs, being irrelevant their hierarchical position, irrespectively of whether they exercise legislative, 
executive, judicial or other functions and whether they are part of the central government or an 
autonomous territorial unit. Paragraph 2 of this article says that “an organ includes any person or 
entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State”. In his commentaries, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
12 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 89. 
 
13 DIXON (2007) p. 247. 
 
14 CRAWFORD (2002)  p. 91. 
 
15 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 93. 
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Crawford points out that the term “includes” implies that the classification of an entity as an organ 
cannot be limited to those which have that condition under internal law because that status may be 
exercised in practice without being recognised in the internal law of the State and “a State cannot 
avoid responsibility for the conduct of a body which does in truth act as one of its organs merely by 
denying it that status under internal law”16. Dixon also claims that “it is also clear that a person or 
group or entity may be equated with an organ of the State even if it does not have that status 
officially under internal law”17
 
. International tribunals have advanced several tests for determining 
when a group of persons can be considered as a de facto organ and therefore its conduct can be 
attributed to the State. This issue has turned into a matter of control over the group and will be 
analysed in the next sections. 
The organs’ conduct is attributable when they are acting in their official capacity, not as merely 
private persons, and even if they exceed their competence or contravene instructions (as clarified by 
article 7) but it may be difficult to distinguish in practice between an ultra vires act carried out under 
the official capacity of the organ and a private act, not attributable to the State. For attribution to be 
possible it is only needed that the organ is acting “in an apparently official capacity or under colour 
of authority”18
 
.  
Article 5 attributes to the State the conduct of a person or entity which, not being an organ of the 
State, is empowered by its internal law to exercise elements of governmental authority, provided that 
the entity is acting in that capacity. This article responds to the phenomenon of privatisation of 
formerly public functions and seeks to prevent States escaping responsibility by delegating functions 
which involve the exercise of authority to entities which are not legally recognized as State organs. 
These entities engage the responsibility of the State even if they are autonomous and they have 
discretion to exercise the authority as long as the conduct in question was an exercise of the elements 
of authority which the internal law empowers them to carry out. In contrast with article 8, here it is 
not necessary to prove the existence of control over the entity since the link with the State for the 
attribution operation is the empowerment by the internal law to the entity to exercise that element of 
governmental authority.  
 
Article 6 deals with the specific situation of the attribution of conduct of an organ placed at the 
disposal of a State by another State: the conduct has to be attributed to the former State if the organ is 
exercising elements of authority of the State at whose disposal it is been situated.  
 
Article 7 clarifies that the conduct of an organ of a State or a person empowered to exercise elements 
of authority are to be attributed to the State if they act in that capacity, even if they exceed their 
                                                        
16 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 98 
 
17 DIXON (2007) p. 248 
 
18 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 99 
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authority or contravene instructions. The State is responsible for ultra vires acts of its organs or 
entities empowered to exercise its authority as long as they have acted under that official capacity, 
being irrelevant whether the excess “was manifest or undiscoverable”19
 
- all that is relevant is that the 
act was done in their official capacity and not acting as a private person. Any other position would 
allow the State to invoke its internal law to escape from the attribution of international responsibility. 
Article 8 deals with the attribution of conduct of a private person or group to the State on the basis 
that they are “in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of, that State in 
carrying out the conduct”. This article attributes conduct on the basis of instructions or control. 
Therefore, attribution is not based on a legal relationship between the actors and the State but on the 
basis of a factual link: conduct following the State’s instructions or under its direction or control. 
These situations are consequently an exception to the general principle that acts of private persons 
are not to be attributed to the State. It is foreseen in order to prevent a State escaping responsibility 
for conduct which it instructs or controls. In regard to the issuance of instructions there may be 
practical difficulties of evidence but the concept is quite clear. On the other hand, the direction and 
control requirement needs further specification, which has been given by jurisprudence, with 
different international tribunals advancing several different control tests to resolve this attribution 
issue. The definition of the required degree of control is the central issue of this essay and it will be 
set out in the next sections.  
 
Article 9 attributes to the State the conduct of a person or group if they are in fact exercising elements 
of governmental authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances 
that call for that exercise. 
 
Article 10 deals with the conduct of an insurrectional or other movement. If the insurrectional 
movement becomes the new government of the State its conduct will be considered an act of state 
under international law. The conduct of a movement which establishes a new State in part of the 
territory will be considered an act of that new State. Therefore, if the movement does not succeed in 
becoming the government or creating a new State the conduct will not be attributed to the State but 
to the persons who constitute the movement. However, the State may still have responsibility for its 
own conduct in relation to the acts of the movement, which may be subsumed in any of the other 
grounds for the attribution of conduct to the State, for instance for failing to prevent, to minimise the 
disruptive effects, or to punish the movement’s conduct if it was able to do so. 
 
Article 11 establishes that if the State acknowledges and adopts a conduct which is not attributable to 
it on the basis of the previous provisions, then that conduct will be attributable to it to the extent of 
that acknowledgment and adoption. 
 
 
                                                        
19 DIXON (2007) p. 248 
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2.3 Attribution of responsibility as a question of control: different standards 
 
From now on this essay will focus on a specific controversial issue within the operation of attribution 
of conduct to a State: on the requirements for attributing to a State the acts of a private group carried 
out in the territory of another State.  
 
The conduct of a private group that acts in a State can be attributed to another State by considering 
the group an organ of that latter State, and therefore all the conduct in that capacity will be 
potentially attributable; or by proving that the group was in fact acting on the instructions of the 
latter State or under its direction and control, case in which those specific acts will be attributable to 
the directing State. Both, the equation with an organ, and the direction and control of specific 
operations of a private group have become a question of control20
 
. The degrees of control for both 
grounds of attribution are different between them, and they also differ depending on the case law 
examined, with different control tests advanced by the ICJ, the ICTY and the ECtHR. The following 
sections set out the leading cases in which these international tribunals have set forward their control 
tests and compare the different standards of control they involve. Finally, they will be contrasted 
taking into consideration the different rationales that lie behind them and a preference among them 
will be favoured. 
 
3. The control tests put forward by the International Court of Justice 
 
The International Court of Justice (hereafter, the ICJ) has set forward two control tests21 in order to 
determine whether the acts of groups of individuals within the territory of a State can be attributed 
to another State. The leading case is Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua22
                                                        
20 See TALMON ( 2009) p. 496 
, 
which was questioned by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY. The ICJ maintained its position in two 
 
21 TALMON ( 2009) p. 497: points out that “the literature and decisions of other international courts, with very few 
exceptions, refer only to one test in connection with the ICJ- the –effective control– test. The ICJ, however, has in fact 
applied two different tests”. 
 
22 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits, Judgment, 
I.C.J. Reports (1986) p. 14 (hereafter, Nicaragua v USA). 
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subsequent important cases which will be examined: the Armed Activities case23 and the Genocide 
Convention case24
 
. 
 
3.1. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua case 
 
In Nicaragua v USA the Court had to decide, among other issues, whether to upheld Nicaragua’s 
claim that the United States had “devised the strategy and directed the tactics of the contra force, and 
provided direct combat support for its military operations”25. The ICJ said that it was not satisfied 
that all the operations of the contras followed a strategy and tactics set by the United States but the 
Court considered that “the financial support given by the Government of the United States to the 
military and paramilitary activities of the contras in Nicaragua is a fully established fact”26. The ICJ 
asserted that taking into account the evidence, it was not satisfied that the United States had created 
the contras nor that it provided “direct and critical combat support” to them but “holds it established 
that the United States authorities largely financed, trained, equipped, armed and organized the 
FDN”27
 
. 
a) The so-called “strict control test” or “agency test” 
 
The ICJ first analysed what later on has been called the “strict control test” or “agency test”: the 
Court enquired itself “whether or not the relationship of the contras to the United States Government 
was so much one of dependence on the one side and control on the other that it would be right to 
equate the contras, for legal purposes, with an organ of the United States Government, or as acting 
on behalf of that Government”28. The Court relied on the assessment of the Intelligence Committee of 
May 1983 to establish that the unique factor of control that the United States could exert was the 
“cessation of aid”29 and concluded, a sensu contrario, that there was a “potential for control inherent in 
the degree of the contras’ dependence on aid”30
                                                        
23 Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J Reports (2005) 
p. 168 (hereafter, Armed Activities case). 
.  
 
24 Application of the Convention on the prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia 
and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports (2007) p. 43 (hereafter, Genocide Convention case). 
 
25 Nicaragua v USA (para 102). 
 
26 Nicaragua v USA (para 107). 
 
27 Nicaragua v USA (para 108). 
 
28 Nicaragua v USA (para 109). 
 
29 Nicaragua v USA (para 109). 
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In spite of this finding the Court concluded that “there is no clear evidence of the United States 
having actually exercised such a degree of control in all fields as to justify treating the contras as 
acting on its behalf”31. The ICJ considered that the assistance of the United States to the contras had 
been crucial “but it is insufficient to demonstrate their complete dependence on the United States 
aid”32
 
.  
Therefore, the so called “strict control test” or “agency test” developed by the ICJ to equate a group 
of individuals with an organ of a State requires a relationship of dependence and control to the 
degree that it can be qualified as “complete dependence” on the State. Dependence and control can 
be considered two correlative elements33: the group is dependent in the extent to which it is 
controlled by the State34
 
, and that dependence and control must be “complete”. The ICJ analyses the 
elements of control the State has and that control requirement has to be proved at two levels: the 
potential for control and the actual exercise of control. Moreover, that actual exercise of control must 
extent to “all fields” of the group’s activity.  
The ICJ accepted that during the initial periods of contra activities they were so dependent but to 
claim that the United States directed the strategy and tactics “depends on the extent to which the 
United States made use of the potential for control inherent in that dependence”35 and the Court 
considered insufficient the evidence so as to decide on that actual exercise of control. Thus, the ICJ 
concluded that the contras could not be equated with an organ of the United States for legal 
purposes. This denial led the Court to reject Nicaragua’s claim which attributed responsibility to the 
United States for all the activities of the contras, which Nicaragua regards as “essentially the acts of 
the United States”36
 
.  
Hence, the control test used by the ICJ to decide whether a group can be equated with a State organ 
(what would be tantamount to characterising them as a de facto organ of the United States), or be 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
30 Nicaragua v USA (para 109). 
 
31 Nicaragua v USA (para 109). 
 
32 Nicaragua v USA (para 110). 
 
33 See (TALMON ( 2009) p.498): he argues that “dependence and control are thus two sides of the same coin”. 
 
34 See (TALMON ( 2009) p. 497): “control results from dependence or, looking at it from the other side, dependence 
creates the potential for control”. 
 
35 Nicaragua v USA (para 110). 
 
36 Nicaragua v USA (para 114). 
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considered to be acting on its behalf, is a highly demanding one in terms of evidence. It requires 
proving the complete dependence37
 
 of the group, which in turn involves complete control of the 
State over it, and the examining of the element of control involves assessing the potential for control 
and also the actual exertion of that capacity of control “in all fields” of activity of the group. These 
requirements are very demanding and it is very difficult for an applicant State to provide enough 
evidence to the Court to satisfy this high threshold. On the other hand, this demanding threshold of 
evidence ensures that the equation of a group with an organ of a State is only carried out in cases in 
which there is a firm basis supported by enough evidence so as to attribute the State acts of private 
individuals, which must be exceptional, taking into account that the general principle is that States 
are only responsible for their own conduct and that equation with a State organ involves the holding 
of responsibility also for ultra vires acts, according to Article 7 of the ILC Articles.  
 
b) The effective control test 
 
Having denied the equation of the contras with an organ of the United States, there were still issues 
of responsibility to decide upon38. The United States may still have been held responsible for single 
acts over which it had control or had given instructions, or it still may have been held responsible for 
complicity or for inciting the commitment of any such acts39
 
. 
The ICJ asserted that “even the general control by the respondent State over a force with a high 
degree of dependence on it, would not in themselves mean, without further evidence, that the 
United States directed or enforced the perpetration of acts contrary to human rights and 
humanitarian law alleged [...] Such acts could well be committed by members of the contras without 
the control of the United States. For this conduct to give rise to legal responsibility of the United 
States, it would in principle have to be proved that that State had effective control of the military or 
paramilitary operations in the course of which the alleged violations were committed”40
 
. 
Therefore, the denial of the equation of the contras with an organ of the United States led the Court 
to deny the responsibility of the United States for all its acts, responsibility which arises when 
dealing with State organs even in relation to ultra vires acts.  Precisely due to the negation of their 
                                                        
37 See (TALMON (2009) p. 499) for a definition of complete dependence: “complete dependence means that the 
secessionist entity is “lacking any real autonomy” and is “merely an instrument” or “agent” of the outside power 
through which the latter is acting [...] Common objectives may make the secessionist entity an ally, albeit a highly 
dependent ally, of the outside power, but not necessarily its organ”. 
  
38 See (TALMON (2009) p. 502) for an assertion of the subsidiary character of the “effective control” test. 
 
39 Nicaragua v USA (para 114 a contrario, since it denies that these issues would arise in case the contras were equated 
with an organ of the United States). 
 
40 Nicaragua v USA (para 115). 
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characterisation as a de facto organ, there lacks the necessary link for all their acts to be attributable to 
the State. The ICJ asserted the general principle that “the contras remain responsible for their acts, 
and that the United States is not responsible for the acts of the contras, but for its own conduct vis-à-
vis Nicaragua, including conduct related to the acts of the contras”41
 
. Consequently, after having 
denied the equation of the contras with an organ ( id est, after the application of the so-called “strict 
control test” or “agency test”) which would have involved to a wider scope for international 
responsibility, the ICJ applied the effective control test, which involves holding a State responsible only 
for the acts of a group over which the State had effective control, and this responsibility was denied 
in this case for lack of evidence.  
Providing evidence of control over specific operations of a group involves proving the instructions, 
command or particular instances of State control over the acts in question, access to which is really 
difficult, since public demonstrations to that effect are unlikely to be done.  
 
Consequently, the effective control test, while more limited in the scope of responsibility engaged and 
more limited in the sense of evidence required (particular instances of control), remains a demanding 
test42 since a general degree of control or dependence of the group is not enough but the applicant 
State needs to provide evidence of control in relation to the specific acts at issue43
 
 (in this case, 
violations of human rights and humanitarian law) over which responsibility seeks to be attributed to 
the respondent State. 
The United States was held responsible for its own conduct in relation to the contras: “by training, 
arming, equipping, financing and supplying the contra forces or otherwise encouraging, supporting 
and aiding military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua, has acted, against the 
Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to intervene 
in the affairs of another State”44. The ICJ also held: “and further by those acts of intervention [...] 
which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its 
obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State”45
                                                        
41 Nicaragua v USA (para 116). 
. The United 
States was also held responsible for its own conduct for producing a manual (“Operaciones 
sicológicas en Guerra de guerrillas”) and spreading it among the contras, what was regarded as 
having “encouraged the commission by them of acts contrary to general principles of humanitarian 
 
42 (TALMON (2009) p.  503) considers that “while the burden of proof for the –effective control– test is lower than that 
for the “strict control” test, in practice it will be extremely difficult to establish”.  
 
43 (TALMON (2009) p.  502) “the object of control is no longer the secessionist entity but the activities or operations 
giving rise to the internationally wrongful act”. 
 
44 Nicaragua v USA (holding, para 3). 
 
45 Nicaragua v USA (holding, para 4). 
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law; but does not find a basis for concluding that any such acts which may have been committed are 
imputable to the United States of America as acts of the United States of America”46
 
.  
 
3.2.  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo case 
 
The ICJ in the Armed Activities case also had to decide on the attribution to the State parties of armed 
activities carried out by groups of rebels. Among the many claims put forward by the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (hereafter, DRC) one was that the Court declared “that the Republic of 
Uganda, by engaging in military and paramilitary activities against the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo, by occupying its territory and by actively extending military, logistic, economic and financial 
support to irregular forces operating there, has violated the following principles of conventional and 
customary law [...]”47. On the other hand, Uganda claimed that its deployment of soldiers in the 
territory of the DRC was justified as self-defence for it alleged that the DRC “provided military and 
logistical support to anti-Ugandan insurgents”48
 
. 
 
a)  Non-attribution to the DRC of the attacks by the ADF 
 
Uganda claimed that “there was a tripartite conspiracy in 1998 between the DRC, the ADF and the 
Sudan; that the Sudan provided military assistance to the DRC’s army and to anti-Ugandan rebel 
groups”49. The ICJ considered “that it has not been presented with evidence that can safely be relied 
on in a court of law to prove that there was an agreement between the DRC and the Sudan to 
participate in or support military action against Uganda”50. The ICJ focused on the claim that the 
attacks by the ADF51
                                                        
46 Nicaragua v USA (holding, para 9). 
 had increased due to the support allegedly provided by the DRC. Uganda 
justified its actions as self-defence due to the claimed DRC collaboration with the rebel groups but 
the evidence provided to satisfy the ICJ of this alleged assistance was not found convincing by the 
Court, which asserted that “these may all be described as internal documents, often with no 
authenticating features, and containing unsigned, unauthenticated and sometimes illegible witness 
statements. These do not have the quality or character to satisfy the Court as to the matters 
 
47 Armed Activities case (para 24). 
 
48 Armed Activities case (para 35). 
 
49 Armed Activities case (para 121). 
 
50 Armed Activities case (para 130). 
 
51 Abbreviation used by the ICJ to refer to the Allied Democratic Forces, a rebel anti-Ugandan group. 
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claimed”52. Therefore, the ICJ concluded that “there is no satisfactory proof of the involvement in 
these attacks, direct or indirect, of the Government of the DRC. The attacks did not emanate from 
armed bands or irregulars sent by the DRC or on behalf of the DRC, within the sense of Article 3 (g) 
of the General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX) on the definition of aggression [...] The Court is of 
the view that, on the evidence before it, even if this series of deplorable attacks could be regarded as 
cumulative in character, they still remain non-attributable to the DRC”53
 
. 
 
b) Non-attribution to Uganda of MLC’s conduct and its engagement of international responsibility 
 
The DRC claimed before the ICJ that “Uganda both created and controlled the MLC rebel group led 
by Mr. Bemba”54. Uganda recognised assistance to the MLC “while insisting that its assistance to Mr. 
Bemba –was always limited and heavily conditioned–. Uganda has explained that it gave “just 
enough” military support to the MLC to help Uganda achieve its objectives”55
 
.  
The ICJ reached the conclusion “that there is no credible evidence to suggest that Uganda created the 
MLC. Uganda has acknowledged giving training and military support and there is evidence to that 
effect. The court has not received probative evidence that Uganda controlled or could control the 
manner in which Mr. Bemba put such assistance to use. In the view of the Court, the conduct of the 
MLC was not that of –an organ– of Uganda (article 4, International Law Commission Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, 2001), nor that of an entity exercising 
elements of governmental authority on its behalf (Art. 5). The Court has considered whether the 
MLC’s conduct was –on the instructions of, or under the direction or control of– Uganda (Art. 8) and 
finds that there is no probative evidence by reference to which it has been persuaded that this was 
the case”56
 
.  
This means that the ICJ rejected equating the MLC with an organ of Uganda or with a para-statal 
entity, as well as denied the engagement of its responsibility on the basis of issuance of instructions 
or control. The ICJ considered that “Accordingly, no issue arises in the present case as to whether the 
requisite tests are met for sufficiency of control of paramilitaries”57
                                                        
52 Armed Activities case (para 134). 
 and cited Nicaragua v USA when 
mentioning the control tests, which would be applied in case that the ICJ considered that the 
 
53 Armed Activities case (para 146). 
 
54 Armed Activities case (para 155). The ICJ uses the abbreviation MLC to refer to the Congo Liberation Movement. 
 
55 Armed Activities case (para 155). 
 
56 Armed Activites case (para 160). 
 
57 Armed Activities case (para 160). 
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situation was such as to call for their application in order to decide whether the paramilitaries could 
be equated with State organs or acted under the control of the Respondent. Since the ICJ denied that 
there was enough evidence to consider any of these scenarios in this case, the Court did not even 
enter to apply the control tests to the facts. 
 
Despite this non -attribution of the MLC’s conduct to Uganda, the ICJ claimed that the training and 
assistance provided by Uganda engaged its international responsibility for violating the international 
law prohibitions of intervention and of use of force as well as constituting a violation of the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the DRC58
 
. 
 
3.3.  Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide 
 
In the Genocide Convention case the ICJ had to decide on the claim by Bosnia and Herzegovina 
against Serbia and Montenegro which affirmed that the Respondent State “under the guise of 
protecting the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in fact conceived and shared with them 
the vision of a –Greater Serbia–, in pursuit of which it gave its support to those persons and groups 
responsible for the activities which allegedly constitute the genocidal acts complained of”59. The ICJ 
considered as established that the Respondent was “making considerable military and financial 
support available to the Republika Srpska, and had it withdrawn that support, this would have 
greatly constrained the options that were available to the Republika Srpska authorities”60. The Court 
only considered proved the dolus specialis (necessary for the atrocities at issue to constitute genocide) 
in relation to the massacres at Srebrenica in July 1995 and, in that regard concluded “that acts of 
genocide were committed in operations led by members of the VRS, the Court now turns to the 
question whether those acts are attributable to the Respondent”61
 
. The ICJ first dealt with the issue of 
attribution of the Genocide at Srebrenica to Serbia and Montenegro (at the time named Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia, hereafter FRY) on the basis of different rules of international responsibility 
of States for internationally wrongful acts (basically articles 4 and 8 of the ILC Articles), then 
analysed whether the Respondent could be held responsible for acts within Article III, paragraphs (b) 
to (e), and finally if the Respondent had failed to fulfil its obligation to prevent and punish genocide. 
 
                                                        
58 See Armed Activites case, para 165. 
 
59 Genocide Convention case (para 237). 
 
60 Genocide Convention case (para 241). 
 
61 Genocide Convention case (para 376). 
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a) The question of attribution of the Srebrenica Genocide to the Respondent on the basis of the 
conduct of its organs 
 
The ICJ first analysed the attribution of the Genocide at Srebrenica to Serbia and Montenegro on the 
basis of article 4 ILC Articles: whether the acts were carried out by organs of the Respondent. The 
Court first examined whether the acts were committed by persons or entities which had that status 
(of organs) of the FRY according to its internal law and answered that question in the negative. The 
ICJ pointed out that “neither the Republika Srpska, nor the VRS were de jure organs of the FRY, 
since none of them had the status of organ of that State under its internal law”62. Having denied that 
the genocide were committed by de jure organs of the FRY, the ICJ analysed the Applicant’s 
allegation according to which the Republika Srpska, the VRS and paramilitary groups such as the 
“Scorpions” had to be considered as de facto organs of the FRY, so that all their acts in that capacity 
would be attributable to the FRY. The ICJ refered to Nicaragua v USA as leading case regarding the 
attribution of responsibility to a State for acts of groups which “in fact act under such strict control 
by the State that they must be treated as its organs”63. The Court reproduced the relevant paragraphs 
of Nicaragua v USA (see above paragraph 2.1.a.). The ICJ claimed that Nicaragua v USA shows that the 
ICJ jurisprudence allows the equation of groups with State organs irrespective of not having that 
status under internal law since “any other solution would allow States to escape responsibility by 
choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed independence would be purely 
fictitious”64. However, the ICJ recalled the exceptional nature of this equation and denied it in the 
present case for considering that “neither the Republika Srpska nor the VRS could be regarded as 
mere instruments through which the FRY was acting, and as lacking any real autonomy”65
 
. The 
Court took the view that they had a margin of independence. 
 
b) The question of attribution of the Srebrenica Genocide to the Respondent on the basis of direction 
or control 
 
After having denied the claim that the genocide was committed by de jure or de facto organs of the 
FRY, the ICJ assessed whether it was committed by persons (who despite not being organs of the 
FRY) whose acts were attributable to the FRY on the basis of article 8 ILC Articles: for acting on the 
instructions or under the direction or control of the Respondent. The ICJ underlined that this is a 
“completely separate issue” from the question of equation with organs of the FRY, since answering 
positively to this question would not involve an equation with State organs but “would merely mean 
                                                        
62 Genocide Convention case (para 386). 
 
63 Genocide Convention case (para 391). 
 
64 Genocide Convention case (para 392). 
 
65 Genocide Convention case (para 394). 
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that the FRY’s international responsibility would be incurred owing to the conduct of those of its 
own organs which gave the instructions or exercised the control resulting in the commission of acts 
in breach of its international obligations”66
 
.  
The Court examined article 8 of ILC Articles taking into account Nicaragua v USA, reproducing the 
relevant paragraphs of that case (see above paragraph 2.1.b.) in which the Court put forward the 
effective control test over specific operations of the group  in order to determine whether the State 
could be held responsible for acts committed during those operations. The ICJ pointed out that the 
effective control test differs from the strict control test in two regards: now there is no need to show 
that the group who committed the wrongful acts was in a relation of “complete dependence” to the 
State but that it acted under its instructions or its effective control, which must be exercised in 
relation to the specific acts at stake and “not generally in respect of the overall actions taken”67. 
Moreover, the ICJ addressed the Applicant’s claim that due to the “particular nature” of the crime of 
genocide, in the sense of being composed by a lot of specific acts that are separate but coordinated, 
the effective control test should be analysed not in relation to the specific acts but to the whole 
operations. The Court rejected this claim by asserting that “the particular characteristics of genocide 
do not justify the Court in departing from the criterion elaborated [...] The rules for attributing 
alleged internationally wrongful conduct to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in 
question in the absence of a clearly expressed lex especialis”68
 
.  
 
c) The rejection of the tests advanced by the ICTY Appeals Chamber 
 
In this case, the ICJ also addressed the Applicant’s questioning of the validity of applying the test 
proposed in Nicaragua v USA. The Applicant referred to the ICTY Appeals Chamber departure of the 
ICJ jurisprudence in the Prosecutor v Tádic case (analysed below, in 3.1) by applying their own test: the 
“overall control test”, which was applied to characterise the conflict as international and also to 
attribute the Bosnian Serbs’ acts to the FRY, and was regarded as satisfied in that case.  
 
The ICJ asserted that it “has given careful consideration to the Appeals Chamber’s reasoning [...] but 
finds unable to subscribe to the Chamber’s view”69
                                                        
66 Genocide Convention case (para 397). 
. The Court claimed that it is not logically 
necessary to use the same test to decide both issues and that “insofar as the –overall control– test is 
employed to determine whether or not an armed conflict is international, which was the sole 
question which the Appeals Chamber was called upon to decide, it may well be that the test is 
 
67 Genocide Convention case (para 400). 
 
68 Genocide Convention case (para 401). 
 
69 Genocide Convention case (para 403). 
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applicable and suitable [...] the ICTY presented the “overall control” test as equally applicable to the 
law of State responsibility for the purpose of determining [...] when a State is responsible for acts 
committed by paramilitary units, armed forces which are not among its official organs. In this 
context, the argument in favour of that test is unpersuasive”70
 
.  
The ICJ rejected the application of the overall control test in the context of attribution of acts when 
dealing with State responsibility for considering that “the –overall control– test has the major 
drawback of broadening the scope of State responsibility well beyond the fundamental principle 
governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for its own conduct [...] 
the “overall control” test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point, the 
connection which must exist between the conduct of a State’s organs and its international 
responsibility”71
 
.  
Therefore, the ICJ analysed the attribution of responsibility on the basis of article 8 of the ILC Articles 
applying the effective control test developed in Nicaragua v USA and concluded that, taking into 
consideration the evidence, it had not been proved that the massacres were committed following the 
instructions or under the direction or effective control of the Respondent State. Consequently, the 
acts of genocide could not be attributed to the FRY neither under article 4 nor under article 8 of the 
ILC Articles, which were regarded as the only applicable rules among the section of Attribution of 
conduct to a State (articles 4 to 11)72
 
 of the ILC Articles. 
 
d) The question of responsibility, in respect of Srebrenica, for acts of Article III, paragraphs (b) to (e), 
of the Genocide Convention 
 
The ICJ, after having rejected the attribution to Serbia and Montenegro of the acts of genocide, 
assessed whether its responsibility could be engaged on the basis of one of the acts enumerated in 
Article III: conspiracy to commit genocide (paragraph b), direct and public incitement to commit 
genocide (paragraph c), and complicity in the commission of genocide (paragraph e)73
                                                        
70 Genocide Convention case (para 404). 
. The Court 
asserted that it was clear from the facts that conspiracy and incitement did not apply in this case 
since it had not been proved that organs of the FRY or persons acting under its instructions or 
effective control committed acts of conspiracy or incitement. The ICJ focused on analysing what it 
 
71 Genocide Convention case (para 406). 
 
72 See Genocide Convention case (para 414) for the reasoning denying the applicability to this case of other Articles of 
Chapter II, Part One of the ILC Articles for not matching the facts of this case with the circumstances foreseen in the 
rest of provisions regarding attribution. 
 
73 Paragraph d, which refers to attempt to commit genocide is not analysed because there was no claim regarding it.  
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regarded as a “more delicate question”74
 
:  whether the FRY could be held responsible for complicity 
in genocide within paragraph (e).  
The ICJ made some preliminary remarks regarding the nature of complicity: in international law it 
does not refer to the issuance of instructions to the perpetrators of the acts, for if that were the case 
the acts would be attributable to the State (under Article 8 ILC Articles). The Court considered that 
complicity “includes the provision of means to enable or facilitate the commission of the crime”75 
and the ICJ considered it to be similar “to a category found among the customary rules constituting 
the law of state responsibility, that of the –aid or assistance– furnished by one State for the 
commission of a wrongful act by another State”76. Reference was made to article 16 of the ILC 
Articles, which was taken to reflect custom. For asserting complicity, the Court considered it 
necessary that the accomplice should at least have acted knowingly, aware of the dolus specialis of the 
perpetrator and “is not convinced by the evidence furnished by the Applicant that the above 
conditions were met [...] because it is not established beyond any doubt in the argument between the 
Parties whether the authorities of the FRY supplied- and continued to supply- the VRS leaders who 
decided upon and carried out those acts of genocide with their aid and assistance, at a time when 
those authorities were clearly aware that genocide was about to take place or was under way”77
 
. 
Therefore, the ICJ concluded that the Respondent could not be held internationally responsible for 
complicity in the commission of genocide. 
 
e) The question of responsibility for Breach of the Obligations to Prevent and Punish Genocide 
 
The Court also dealt with whether the Respondent fulfilled its obligations under Article I of the 
Genocide Convention to prevent and to punish genocide. The Court underlined that these are two 
distinct legal obligations. The ICJ first assessed the fulfilment of the obligation to prevent genocide 
pointing out that they were not aiming to establish a general jurisprudence in relation to obligations 
of States to prevent certain conducts and that the Court “will therefore confine itself to determining 
the specific scope of the duty to prevent in the Genocide Convention”78
 
. 
                                                        
74 Genocide Convention case (para 418). 
 
75 Genocide Convention case (para 419). 
 
76 Genocide Convention case (para 419). 
 
77 Genocide Convention case (para 422). 
 
78 Genocide Convention case (para 429). 
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The ICJ pointed out that “it is clear that the obligation in question is one of conduct and not one of 
result”79 which consists in the duty “to employ all means reasonably available to them, so as to 
prevent genocide so far as possible. A State does not incur responsibility simply because the desired 
result is not achieved; responsibility is however incurred if the State manifestly failed to take all 
measures to prevent genocide which were within its power, [...] In this area the notion of –due 
diligence–, which calls for an assessment in concreto, is of critical importance”80
 
 . 
The Court also clarified the distinction of this duty with complicity: “while complicity results from 
commission, violation of the obligation to prevent results from omission”81 and that while in 
complicity the State organs need to be aware that genocide was about to be committed or currently 
happening, “by contrast, a State may be found to have violated its obligation to prevent even though 
it had no certainty, at the time when it should have acted, but failed to do so, that genocide was 
about to be committed or was under way;[...] it is enough that the State was aware, or should 
normally have been aware, of the serious danger that acts of genocide would be committed”82. The 
ICJ considered that the FRY authorities “could hardly have been unaware of the serious risk of it 
once the VRS forces had decided to occupy the Srebrenica enclave”83. The ICJ claimed that the 
Respondent had not proved to have taken any action to prevent the massacres and concluded “that 
the Respondent violated its obligation to prevent the Srebrenica genocide in such a manner as to 
engage its international responsibility”84
 
. 
The ICJ examined the obligation to punish genocide, focusing on the obligation to co-operate with 
the “international penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction with respect to those Contracting Parties 
which shall have accepted its jurisdiction”85
 
. The ICJ asserted that the ICTY is to be regarded an 
“international penal tribunal” within the meaning of Article VI and that the Respondent must be 
deemed as having accepted its jurisdiction. In the light of the facts, the ICJ concluded that the 
Respondent had not co-operated with the ICTY, and had therefore breached its obligation to punish 
genocide.  
                                                        
79 Genocide Convention case (para 430). 
 
80 Genocide Convention case (para 430). 
 
81 Genocide Convention case (para 432). 
 
82 Genocide Convention case (para 432). 
 
83 Genocide Convention case (para 436). 
 
84 Genocide Convention case (para 438). 
 
85 Article VI of the Genocide Convention. 
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In sum, the ICJ considered that “the Respondent failed to comply both with its obligation to prevent 
and its obligation to punish genocide deriving from the Convention, and that its international 
responsibility is thereby engaged”86
 
. 
 
4. The control tests proposed by the ICTY  
 
Now the focus will be put on a case by the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunal for the 
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 (hereafter, ICTY). 
 
 
4.1.  Prosecutor v Tádic case 
 
In the Prosecutor v Tádic case87, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY had to determine, among other 
issues, whether the conflict between Bosnia and Herzegovina and the FRY, which was clearly 
international before the 19 May 1992, also had that nature afterwards in order to determine the 
applicability of the grave breaches regime of the Geneva Conventions. For this purpose, they had to 
determine “whether the Bosnian Serb Forces- in whose hands the Bosnian victims in this case found 
themselves- could be considered as de iure or de facto organs of a foreign Power, namely the FRY”88
 
. 
 The Court first analysed international humanitarian law (hereafter, IHL) and the criteria for being 
considered a lawful combatant, and “considers that the Third Geneva Convention, by providing in 
Article 4 the requirement of “belonging to a Party to the conflict”, implicitly refers to a test of 
control”89. After underlining that IHL “is a realistic body of law, grounded on the notion of 
effectiveness [...] holds accountable not only for those having formal positions of authority but also 
those who wield de facto power as well as those who exercise control over perpetrators of serious 
violations of international humanitarian law”90. The Court focused on the need to “specify what 
degree of authority or control must be wielded by a foreign State over armed forces fighting on its 
behalf in order to render international an armed conflict which is prima facie internal”91
                                                        
86 Genocide Convention case (para 450). 
. For this 
specification of the notion of control the Court, although taking note of a position to the contrary (see 
 
87 Prosecutor v Tádic case (IT- 94-1-A), Appeals Chamber of  ICTY, Judgment of 15 July 1999 (hereafter, Tádic case). 
 
88 Tádic case (para 87). 
 
89 Tádic case (para 95). 
 
90 Tádic case (para 96). 
 
91 Tádic case (para 97). 
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3.1.d.) claimed that IHL has to be supplemented by the general international law rules of State 
responsibility for it considers that “international humanitarian law does not contain any criteria 
unique to this body of law for establishing when a group of individuals may be regarded as being 
under the control of a State, that is as acting as de facto State officials”92
 
.  
 
a)  The Prosecution position in regards to the Nicaragua test  
 
The Prosecution maintained an interesting position since it claimed that the Trial Chamber of this 
case was wrong in applying Nicaragua v USA and claimed that it should have applied instead “the 
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the relevant principles and authorities of international 
humanitarian law which, in its view, apply a –demonstrable link– test”93. The reason for this 
assertion is that Nicaragua v USA dealt with the issue of State responsibility while the issue in this 
case was about individual criminal responsibility. Hence, the Prosecution considered that “the 
Nicaragua test, while valid within the context of State responsibility, is immaterial to the issue of 
individual criminal responsibility for –grave breaches–. The Appeals Chamber, with respect, does 
not share this view”94. The Court considered that the relevant issue was preliminary to these two 
types of responsibility: “the conditions on which under international law an individual may be held 
to act as a de facto organ of a State”95. The Appeals Chamber asserted that logically these conditions 
must be the same. However, this position is arguable since State responsibility may arise not only 
when individuals act as de facto organs but also in other circumstances, like when a State exercises 
control or gives instructions to private individuals, but also for its own acts of inciting or not 
preventing the acts of private individuals when the State had a duty to do so. These situations were 
analysed by the ICJ in Nicaragua v USA and different control tests were applied, although the Appeal 
Chamber did not share this view of that case either. The Prosecution (and the dissenting opinion of 
Judge McDonald) argued that in Nicaragua v USA the ICJ “first applied the –agency– test when 
considering whether the contras could be equated with United States officials for legal purposes, in 
order to determine whether the United States could incur responsibility in general for the acts of the 
contras [...] the Court then applied the “effective control” test to determine whether the United States 
could be held responsible for particular acts committed by the contras in violation of international 
humanitarian law”96
 
. 
                                                        
92 Tádic case (para 98). 
 
93 Tádic case (para 69). 
 
94 Tádic case (para 103). 
 
95 Tádic case (para 104). 
 
96 Tádic case (para 106). 
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 The Appeals Chamber considered that this understanding of the case was based on a “misreading” 
of the case and claimed that “it is unclear whether the Court is propounding “effective control” as an 
alternative test to that of “dependence and control” set out earlier [...] or is instead spelling out the 
requirements of the same test. The Appeals Chamber believes that the latter is the correct 
interpretation”97. The Appeals Chamber therefore analyses Nicaragua v USA on the basis that the ICJ 
only applied a test for determining whether private individuals are acting as de facto organs of a 
State, and this test involves that the State should issue specific instructions 98. However, a proper 
reading of Nicaragua v USA leads to the position held by the Prosecution and Judge McDonald99. 
This has been clearly confirmed by the ICJ in the Genocide Convention case, in which the Court puts a 
lot of emphasis in clarifying that the equation of private individuals with State organs on the basis of 
the strict control test is a “completely separate issue” (borrowing the words of the ICJ) from the 
attribution of State responsibility on the basis of instructions or control, which should be appreciated 
by applying the effective control test100
 
. In the Genocide Convention case the ICJ was merely reasserting 
the validity of the tests it put forward in Nicaragua v USA after its questioning by the Appeals 
Chamber, so it must be taken to give the correct interpretation of that case.  
The interpretation that the Appeals Chamber does of Nicaragua v USA and the confusion of the two 
tests into one101 explain why it claims that “international law does not require that the particular acts 
in question should be the subject of specific instructions or directives by a foreign State to certain 
armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to be acting as de facto organs of that 
State”102
                                                        
97 Tádic case (para 112). 
. This denial is correct but it assumes that the ICJ asserted what in fact it did not held, for the 
ICJ never required the issuance of specific instructions for the equation of a group with a State organ. 
Those instructions were required, as an effective control test for attributing responsibility to a State for 
the resulting specific acts of a group, after having denied its characterisation as a de facto organ, 
denial which was based not on the lack of specific instructions but on the non-fulfilment of the 
requirements of complete dependence and complete control which conformed the so-called “strict 
control” or “agency” test. Therefore, the test set forward by the Appeals Chamber (the overall control 
test) is not aiming to replace the effective control test (as it claims to be doing when denying that 
 
98 See Tádic case (para 114). 
 
99See TALMON (2009) p. 507 where Talmon points out that “the Appeal Chamber approach was based on a misreading 
of the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment and a misinterpretation of the rules of custormary international law governing State 
responsibility […] the Appeals Chamber did not subscribe to the interpretation that had correctly been put forward 
by the Prosecution and by Judge McDonald in her dissent at the trial stage”. 
 
100 See Genocide Convention case (para 397). 
 
101 This confusion of both tests is apparent, inter alia, in paras 109 (in fine) and 156. 
 
102 Tádic case (para 156). 
InDret   1/2015                                                                                                                   Elena Laura Álvarez Ortega 
23 
 
international law requires specific instructions for considering armed forces as de facto organs of a 
State and offering its test as an alternative), but rather the strict control test. It is a much more 
ambitious position for it means setting a lower threshold of control for the characterisation of groups 
as de facto organs (responsibility therefore arising under Article 4 ILC Articles) and not the grounding 
of  State responsibility under Article 8 ILC Articles, whose scope is limited to the specific acts 
controlled. 
 
  
b)  The Appeals Chamber rejection of the Nicaragua test 
 
“The Appeals Chamber, with respect, does not hold the Nicaragua test to be persuasive”103 and 
argues this position on the basis of the two following topics: on its inconsistency with the logic of 
State responsibility and on its contradiction with judicial and State practice104
- Not consonant with the logic of State responsibility 
.  
 
The Appeals Chamber considers that the test put forward by the ICJ in Nicaragua v USA is not 
consonant with the rationale that underlies the whole system of State responsibility. It claims that 
“the principles of international law concerning the attribution to States of acts performed by private 
individuals are not based on rigid and uniform criteria”105. It uses article 8 ILC Articles as example 
and claims that “the rationale behind this rule is to prevent States from escaping international 
responsibility by having private individuals carry out tasks that may not or should not be performed 
by State officials [...] States are not allowed on the one hand to act de facto through individuals and 
on the other to disassociate themselves from such conduct”106
                                                        
103 Tádic case (para 115). 
. The Court claimed that attribution in 
these cases is based on the requirement of control and claims that the degree of control necessary for 
attribution differs according to the facts of each case and not necessarily always there will be a high 
threshold. The Court asserts that the law on State responsibility “is based on a realistic concept of 
accountability, which disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that States entrusting some 
functions to individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, even when they act 
 
104 It is interesting to note that Judge Shahabuddeen in his Separate Opinion asserts that while he agrees with the 
Appeals Chamber that there was an international conflict, he asserts that “I am unclear about the necessity to 
challenge Nicaragua (para 5) [...] On the basis of Nicaragua , I have no difficulty in concluding that the findings of the 
Trial Chamber sufffice to show that the FRY was using force through the VRS against BH, even if it is supposed that 
the facts were not sufficient to fix the FRY with responsibility for any delictual acts committed by the VRS. The FRY 
and BH were therefore in an armed conflict within the meaning of article 2, first paragraph, of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention” (para 14). 
 
105 Tádic case (para 117). 
 
106 Tádic case (para 117). 
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contrary to their directives”107
 
. This statement can readily be shared but in answering for their 
actions when an organised group acts contrary to their instructions, State responsibility seems more 
logically to arise due to its incitement or support, which is the real own conduct of the State, and not 
for conduct of the group beyond its control, for which the group alone should be held accountable.  
- At variance with judicial and State practice 
 
The Appeals Chamber also argued that the tests set forward in Nicaragua v USA are not persuasive 
claiming that “the effective control test propounded by the International Court of Justice as an 
exclusive and all-embracing test is at variance with international judicial and State practice: such 
practice has envisaged State responsibility in circumstances where a lower degree of control than 
that demanded by the Nicaragua test was exercised”108
 
. The Chamber considered that test to be 
appropriate for cases of individuals or disorganised groups but not in cases that dealt with military 
or paramilitary groups.   
First, it is important to point out that this criticism of Nicaragua v USA departs from the consideration 
that it set forward the effective control test as “an exclusive and all-embracing test”. However, as set 
out above, the ICJ in fact set forward two tests, and the effective control test was only applied after 
having denied attribution on the basis of the so- called agency test. This clarification dilutes most of 
the criticism towards Nicaragua, since the ICJ did not require the issuance of specific instruction for a 
group to be considered a de facto organ, and all the criticisms arguing in that sense are therefore 
deemed to fail.  
 
The Chamber enumerated many cases that allegedly contradict the need of specific directives to be 
considered as acting on behalf of the State. However, apart from the confusion amongst both tests, 
most cases set out in the judgment assert State responsibility on the basis of characterisation as de 
facto organs (which obviously does not require the issuance of specific instructions), like the Stephens 
case. Others merely attribute responsibility on different basis which are not relevant for the equation 
with State organs or the determination of the level of control required by article 8 ILC Articles. This 
is the case of the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran case, in which it was conceded 
that the group of students did not initially act on behalf of Iran but it was held responsible for its 
own acts: for failing to prevent the attack, for failing to put an end to it, and finally for publicly 
approving and endorsing the action ex post facto. Therefore, its relevance for excluding the validity of 
the tests put forward by the ICJ in Nicaragua v USA is at most very limited. 
  
 
  
                                                        
107 Tádic case (para 120). 
 
108 Tádic case (para 124). 
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c) Three tests in general international law: specifically, the overall control test 
 
The Appeals Chamber claims that depending on the facts, different levels of control are to be applied 
when private individuals or groups can be considered de facto State organs: “where the question at 
issue is whether a single private individual or a group that is not militarily organised has acted as a 
de facto State organ when performing a specific act, it is necessary to ascertain whether specific 
instructions concerning the commission of that particular act had been issued by the State [...] By 
contrast, control by a State over subordinate armed forces or militias or paramilitary units may be of 
an overall character (and must comprise more than the mere provision of financial assistance or 
military equipment or training). This requirement, however, does not go so far as to include the 
issuing of specific orders by the State, or its direction of each individual operation”109
 
.  
Regarding the overall control test set forward by the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY for the 
attribution of responsibility for equating militarily organised groups with State organs it claims that: 
“it must be proved that the State wields overall control over the group, not only by equipping and 
financing the group, but also by coordinating or helping in the general planning of its military 
activity”110
 
. Therefore, the overall control test propounded lowers the threshold of control required 
for attributing responsibility to the State, but this occurs not for not requiring the issuing of specific 
instructions or control over the specific operation (which was not required either by the ICJ to equate 
a group with a State organ) but due to the lowering of threshold by the overall control, which is said 
that must go beyond financial and military assistance or training and include the coordination or 
help in the planning of its military activity. These requirements are below the strict control test which 
the ICJ applies to equate a group with a State organ: the ICJ requires that there is a relation of 
complete dependence of the group, the State must correspondingly have complete control over it, 
that potential for control must have been actually used and have extended to all fields of its activity.  
The Appeals Chamber pointed out that in addition to the “test of overall control applying to armed 
groups and that of specific instructions (or subsequent public approval), applying to single 
individuals or militarily unorganised groups. The Appeals Chamber holds the view that 
international law also embraces a third test. This test is the assimilation of individuals to State organs 
on account of their actual behaviour within the structure of a State (and regardless of any possible 
requirement of State instructions”111
                                                        
109 Tádic case (para 137). 
. The Court does not elaborate much on this test but cites some 
cases in which individuals acting as if they were state organs are assimilated to them. However, this 
can be reconducted to a relation of complete dependence and complete control or the issuance of 
instructions. Otherwise, it is difficult to see how the State would have consented to that private 
persons acting in their behalf so as to be able to consider their conduct an act of that State. 
 
110 Tádic case (para 131). 
 
111 Tádic case (para 141). 
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Responsibility could be based on these cases also on the basis of article 9 ILC Articles if those persons 
where exercising elements of the governmental authority in the absence or default of the official 
authorities and in circumstances such as to call for that exercise. In any other case, the State could be 
held responsible for its own conduct for failing to prevent a private person from acting like if he 
were in authority when he was not.  
 
 
d)  International humanitarian law as a lex especialis? 
 
The Appeals Chamber, when analysing the degree of control by a foreign State to convert into 
international a prima facie internal conflict, first analysed IHL, and concluded that it “does not contain 
any criteria unique to this body of law for establishing when a group of individuals may be regarded 
as being under the control of a State [...] Consequently, it is necessary to examine the notion of 
control by a State over individuals laid down in general international law”112. However, the Court 
made reference in a footnote to the existence of “another approach taken to the question of 
imputability in the area of international humanitarian law. The Appeals Chamber is referring to the 
view whereby by virtue of Article 3 of the IVth Hague Convention of 1907 and Article 91 of 
Additional Protocol I, international humanitarian law establishes a special regime of State 
responsibility; under this lex especialis States are responsible for all acts committed by their –armed 
forces– regardless of whether such forces acted as State officials or private persons. [...] This opinion 
was authoritatively set forth by some members of the International Law Commission (“ILC”) 
(Professor Reuter113 [...] Professor Ago114 [...] This view has also been forcefully advocated in the 
legal literature”115. However, the Court considered that “even if this approach is adopted, the test of 
control as delineated by this Chamber remains indispensable for determining when individuals who, 
formally speaking, are not military officials of a State may nevertheless be regarded as forming part 
of the armed forces of such a State”116
 
.  
This approach which considers IHL as a lex especialis is a really interesting one since it may have far- 
reaching consequences. Article 55 ILC Articles establishes that “these articles do not apply where 
                                                        
112 Tádic case (para 98). 
 
113 “Professor Reuter observed that “it was now a principle of codified international law that States were responsible 
for all acts of their armed forces” (Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1975. Vol. I. p.7, para. 5” (cited in 
footnote 117 of the Tádic case). 
 
114 “Professor Ago stated that the IVth Hage Convention of 1907 “made provision for a veritable guarantee covering 
all damage that might be caused by armed forces, whether they had acted as organs or as private persons (ibid, p 16, 
para 4)” (cited in footnote 117 of the Tádic case). 
 
115 Tádic case (footnote 117). 
 
116 Tádic case(footnote 117). 
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and to the extent that the conditions for the exercise of an internationally wrongful act or the content 
or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of 
international law”. The ILC Commentary to the Articles points out that Article 55 “reflects the 
maxim lex especialis derogat legi generali. Although it may provide an important indication, this is 
only one of a number of possible approaches towards determining which of several rules potentially 
applicable is to prevail or whether the rules simply coexist. Another gives priority, as between the 
parties, to the rule which is later in time”117. The consequences of the application of this maxim are 
not straightforward, since the notion of lex especialis covers a wide range of rules118. The ILC 
Commentaries clarify that “article 55 is designed to cover both “strong” forms of lex especialis, 
including what are often referred to as self-contained regimes, as well as “weaker” forms such as 
specific treaty provisions on a single point”119
 
.  
The position of international tribunals seems to be reluctant in accepting the existence of a lex 
especialis as to depart from the general rules of state responsibility. The ICTY did not consider IHL as 
lex especialis, and claimed that even if the contrary approach was taken, there would be still need for 
the test for determining when a group can be considered as part of the armed forces of a State, test 
which would be based on the general rules of state responsibility. In the Genocide Convention case, the 
ICJ rejected the Applicant’s claim which asserted that because of the “particular nature” of genocide 
the effective control test should be analysed not in relation with specific acts but as a with all of them 
as a whole. The ICJ held that “in the absence of a clearly expressed lex especialis”120 the Court is not 
justified in departing from the general rules. This restrictive view of the existence and scope of lex 
especialis is consonant with what Simma and Pulkowski call an universalistic concept of international 
law (in contrast with a particularistic view which regards international law “as the sum total of 
loosely interrelated systems”121
                                                        
117 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 306). 
), adherents to which “choose as their starting point the perspective 
 
118 For an interesting discussion about the lex specialis maxim and its “major built-in problems” see: SIMMA & PULKOWSKI 
(2006) pp. 483-529. In this article the authors set out the difficulties in determining when a rule can be considered 
more special than another, the extension of that specialness and how the consequences of these considerations should 
be determined since they recall that “lawyers make use of various (and sometimes contradictory) “tools” of 
interpretation, including the lex especialis principle, to reconcile competing rationalities expressed in different rules of 
law […] their function may resemble what Vaughan Lowe labeled as interstitial norms: –the choice is made by the 
judge not on the basis of the internal logic of the primary norms, but on the basis of extraneous factors– […] the true 
function of the lex especialis principle lies precisely in its capacity to give articulation to such values and experiences 
of the international decision-maker”. 
 
119 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 308. 
 
120 Genocide Convention case (para 401). 
 
121 SIMMA & PULKOWSKI (2006) p. 495. 
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of general international law. Derogation from the general international law on state responsibility is 
only accepted to the extent that state parties have clearly stated such an intention”122
 
. 
 
5. The control test advanced by the European Court of Human Rights  
 
The European Court of Human Rights (hereafter, ECtHR) has advanced its own test, which lowers 
even more the threshold required for the attribution of State responsibility. 
 
 
5.1. Loizidou v Turkey: effective overall control test 
 
In Loizidou v Turkey123, the ECtHR had to decide whether there had been an interference with the 
Applicant’s property rights. This interference was alleged to be Turkey’s responsibility, with the 
special circumstance that the right was said to have been interfered with by the privation of access to 
her goods that were in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)124, which claims to be a 
State but is not recognised as such by the international community. The Applicant argued that “A 
State cannot by delegation avoid responsibility for breaches of its duties under international law”125. 
The Cypriot Government contended that “Turkey is in effective military and political control of 
northern Cyprus. It cannot escape from its duties under international law by pretending to hand 
over the administration of northern Cyprus to an unlawful “puppet” regime”126
 
.  
The ECtHR decided what it called “the question of imputability” asserting that States can be held 
responsible for acts outside their territory and recalled what the Court held in the Loizidou Judgement 
(Preliminary objections):“that the responsibility of a Contracting Party could also arise when as a 
consequence of military action –whether lawful or unlawful– it exercises effective control of an area 
                                                        
122 SIMMA & PULKOWSKI (2006) p. 495. 
 
123 Loizidou v Turkey (Merits) Judgment, Application nº 15318/89 (18 December 1996).  Hereafter, Loizidou v Turkey. 
 
124 TALMON (2009) p. 508 points out that “the ECtHR was concerned with two distinct questions: (a) whether, as a 
result of the presence of a large number of Turkish troops in northern Cyprus, that part of the Republic of Cyprus was 
within the extraterritorial –jurisdiction of Turkey, a High Contracting Party of the ECHR, and (b) whether acts and 
omissions of the authorities of the Turkish Republic of  Northern Cyprus (TRNC), an  unrecognized secessionist entity 
established in the Turkish occupied area of northern Cyprus, was “imputable to Turkey– and thus entailed her 
responsibility under the ECHR. These two questions, however, are not always clearly kept apart as the Court seizes 
on the element of “control” to establish both extraterritorial “jurisdiction” and imputability seems to derive one from 
the other”.  
 
125 Loizidou v Turkey (para 49). 
 
126 Loizidou v Turkey (para 50). 
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outside its national territory. The obligation to secure, in such an area, the rights and freedoms set 
out in the Convention, derives from the fact of such control whether be it exercised directly, through 
its armed forces, or through a subordinate local administration”127
 
.  
The ECtHR considered that “it is not necessary to determine whether [...] Turkey actually exercises 
detailed control over the policies and actions of the authorities of the “TRNC”. It is obvious from the 
large number of troops engaged in active duties in northern Cyprus [...] that her army exercises 
effective overall control over that part of the island. Such control, according to the relevant test and 
in the circumstances of the case, entails her responsibility for the policies and actions of the –TRNC–
”128. Talmon makes reference to how the ECtHR talks about the “relevant test” but “without making 
any reference to the tests applied by the ICJ and the ICTY, and without giving any further 
explanation, in the Loizidou case the ECtHR developed its own “relevant test” for what it termed a 
“subordinate local administration”129. The ECtHR asserted that it need not pronounce on the 
lawfulness or otherwise of Turkey’s military intervention since it was not relevant for the 
determination of State responsibility and merely recalled that the international community does not 
accept that the TRNC constitutes a State. However, this issue is relevant since Turkey had alleged 
that “its armed forces are acting exclusively in conjunction with and on behalf of the allegedly 
independent and autonomous –TRNC– authorities”130. Therefore, if the TRNC were regarded as an 
independent State and Turkey’s aforementioned allegation were proved, the situation may fall 
within article 6 ILC Articles131
 
.  
Moreover, in regard to the test applied, it is relevant to point out that the ECtHR applied an 
“effective overall control test”, whose requirements did not enumerate, but claimed that there was 
no need for detailed control over the authorities of the TRNC. The test put forward by the court, in 
addition to the lower stringency in regards to the level of control, differs from the tests previously 
advanced by other international tribunals in that it does not refer to control over the individuals or 
groups whose acts are attributed to the State but to the territory in which those individuals are and 
where the acts have been committed132
                                                        
127 Loizidou v Turkey (para 52). 
. This, too, diminishes the stringency of the test, since such a 
 
128 Loizidou v Turkey (para 56). 
 
129 (TALMON, 2009, pg. 509). 
 
130 Loizidou v Turkey (para 54). 
 
131 According to Article 6 the conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered 
an act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of governmental 
authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed. 
 
132 TALMON (2009) p.  511: claims that “actual control over the secessionist entity’s authorities or their activities is also a 
requirement of the “overall” and effective control” tests. Both tests require differenet levels of participation from the 
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general and diffuse control over the territory does not necessarily involve a relevant level of control 
of the group activities133
 
. It would seem more appropriate to attribute responsibility to the State for 
failing to prevent the acts of the group, since the proof of such a level of control may give the State 
influence to act in the territory (so as to require it to prevent harm to individuals) but not necessarily 
proves influence over the group to direct its conduct in any more specific way than taking measures 
to prevent them from acting. 
 
5.2. Behrami and Saramati: ultimate authority and control test 
 
In Behrami and Behrami against France, and Saramati against France, Germany and Norway134, the Grand 
Chamber of the ECtHR had to decide upon the admissibility of both claims.  The Court, when 
dealing with the relevant law, made reference to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International 
Organisations and analysed article 5, which deals with the conduct of organ or agents placed at the 
disposal of an international organisation by a State or another international organisation and 
attributes the conduct to the organisation at whose disposal they are placed “if the organisation 
exercises effective control over that conduct”135
 
. 
The ECtHR quotes part of the ILC Commentary on these articles which asserts that article 5 applies 
to cases of “military contingents that a State placed at the disposal of the [UN] for a peacekeeping 
operation, since the State retains disciplinary powers and criminal jurisdiction [...] the problem arises 
whether a specific conduct of the lent organ or agent has to be attributed to the receiving 
organization or to the lending State or organization [...] Attribution of conduct to the contributing 
State is clearly linked with the retention of some powers by that State over its national contingent 
and thus on the control that the State possesses in the relevant respect. [...] The decisive question in 
relation to attribution of a given conduct appears to be who has effective control over the conduct in 
question”136
                                                                                                                                                                                   
outside power in the organisation, coordination or planning of the secessionist entity’s operations- an element which 
is totally absent from the “effective overall control test test”. 
.  
 
133 Despite the lowering of control requirements, as Talmon claims, “the ECtHR’s test is not used in lieu of the ICJ’s 
“effective control” test but replaces its “strict control test” [...] is used as a basis for equating the authorities of the 
secessionist entity with de facto State organs or “agents” of the outside power for whose acts it may generally be held 
responsible” (TALMON (2009) p.  510). 
 
134Agim Behrami and Bekir Behrami against France (Application no. 71412/01) and Ruzhdi Saramati against France, 
Germany and Norway (Application no. 78166/01)-  Grand Chamber Decision on the Admissibility of the claims 
(hereafter, Behrami and Saramati). 
 
135 Behrami and Saramati (para 30). 
 
136 Behrami and Saramati (para 31). 
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The claims about which ECtHR had to decide were in relation to two organisations: the KFOR137 and 
the UNMIK138: “KFOR was mandated to exercise complete military control in Kosovo. UNMIK was 
to provide an interim international administration and its first Regulation confirmed that the 
authority vested in it by the UNSC comprised all legislative and executive power as well as the 
authority to administer the judiciary [...] Kosovo was, therefore, on those dates under the effective 
control of the international presences which exercised the public powers normally exercised by the 
Government of the FRY”139. The ECtHR analysed “whether the impugned action of KFOR (the 
detention in Saramati) and inaction of UNMIK (failure to de-mine in Behrami) could be attributed to 
the UN [...] the Court has then examined whether it is competent ratione personae to review any 
such action or omission found to be attributable to the UN”140. The ECtHR “considers that issuing 
detention orders fell within the security mandate of KFOR and that the supervision of de-mining fell 
within UNMIK’S mandate”141
 
.  
In relation to the attribution of action by the KFOR to the UN, the ECtHR pointed out that the 
absence of article 43 Agreements makes it necessary for the UN to rely in its member States and other 
international organisations to provide military means to fulfil its collective security role and that 
such multilateral missions have a complex structure which makes necessary some delegation of 
command142. In this context, the ECtHR “considers that the key question is whether the UNSC 
retained ultimate authority and control so that operational command only was delegated”143and 
held that this could be answered positively in this case. For this conclusion the Court took into 
consideration that “the leadership of the military presence was required by the Resolution to report 
to the UNSC so as to allow the UNSC to exercise its overall authority and control”144
                                                        
137 KFOR is the abbreviation used by the ECtHR to refer to the Kosovo force.  
. The Court 
admits that TCN (Troops Contributing Nations) keep some authority over the troops they decide to 
contribute with to the mission but considers that this involvement does not affect the fact that they 
were commanded by the NATO and “finds that the UNSC retained ultimate authority and control 
 
138 UNMIK is the abbreviation used  to refer to the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo. 
 
139 Behrami and Saramati (para 70). 
 
140 Behrami and Saramati (para 121). 
 
141 Behrami and Saramati (para 127). 
 
142 See Behrami and Saramati, (para 132). 
 
143 Behrami and Saramati (para 133). 
 
144 Behrami and Saramati (para 134). 
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and that the effective command of the relevant operational matters was retained by NATO”145. The 
ECtHR further notes that “KFOR was exercising lawfully delegated Chapter VII powers of the UNSC 
so that the impugned action was, in principle, “attributable” to the UN”146
 
.  
The control tests used by the ECtHR here are effective control and ultimate authority and control, 
which applies in spite of the retention by the TCN of some authority over the contingents they send 
to the mission.  The Court considers that NATO’s command, although was not exclusive, was 
“effective”147. In the end, the test applied by the ECtHR is also based on the effectiveness of command 
by the NATO over the peacekeeping forces. The ultimate authority and control test does not replace 
the effectiveness test but merely it is applied to transfer the responsibility from the NATO to the UN, 
by following the chain of command. The effectiveness of control or command here seems to be a less 
stringent concept than the effective control test in Nicaragua v USA, since responsibility is asserted, 
even recognising that some authority is kept by the TCN. However, it is important to recall that the 
facts are different since here the military have the legal status of organs of the lending states. If TCN 
did not retain any control, it is clear that article 5 would apply and the NATO would be responsible 
for their conduct. The effectiveness of command is examined to determine which impact that 
retention of some authority over the troops by TCN should have, and the Court considered that 
conduct should be attributed to the international organisation or the TCN on the basis of effective 
control over it. The ILC Report quoted by the Court favours a use of the effective control test 
similarly as was used by the ICJ in Nicaragua v USA: analysing for each conduct whether it was 
carried out under the effective control of the international organisation or the TCN. The ECtHR 
applied the test claiming that TCN keep authority over certain areas, citing discipline and 
accountability and remains responsible for providing uniforms and equipment148 and held that “the 
court is not persuaded that TCN involvement, either actual or structural, was incompatible with the 
effectiveness (including the unity) of NATO’s operational command. The Court does not find any 
suggestion or evidence of any actual TCN orders concerning, or interference in, the present 
operational (detention) matter”149
 
. 
In relation to the UNMIK, the attribution issue was much easier. The ECtHR asserted that the 
“UNMIK was a subsidiary organ of the UN institutionally directly and fully answerable to the 
UNSC”150
                                                        
145 Behrami and Saramati (para 140). 
, so the Court concluded that its actions were in principle attributable to the UN. 
 
146 Behrami and Saramati (para 141). 
 
147 See Behrami and Saramati, (para 138). 
 
148 See Behrami and Saramati, (para 138). 
 
149 Behrami and Saramati (para 139). 
 
150  Behrami and Saramti (para 142). 
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The Court finally denied its competence ratione personae in this case, since the conduct was 
attributable to the UN which, as asserted in by the ICJ in The Reparations case, has separate legal 
personality and the UN is not a contracting party of the ECHR151
 
. 
 
6.  The rationales behind the different control tests 
 
The advancing of the several control tests analysed above responds to different views on the 
appropriate stringency and threshold of the evidence which needs to be provided to the Court for it 
to consider established that a group of individuals could be equated with a State organ or were in 
fact acting under the direction or control of a given State. These different thresholds in turn involve 
different considerations about the proper balance between the principles which clash and need to be 
taken into account in cases which may potentially fall within articles 4 or 8 ILC Articles: there is a 
need to ensure that responsibility is attributed to the State for its own conduct. As set out above, the 
articles on attribution are a numerus clausus, and the general rule is that the acts of private 
individuals do not engage the responsibility of the State per se (but only if one of the ILC Articles 
applies). On the other hand, there is a need to protect the population from international wrongful 
acts (even if they are not carried out by formal officials) if they are in fact being directed or controlled 
by a State. This idea has become more important lately with the emergence of the recognition of 
human rights and the concept of sovereignty as responsibility. 
 
 
6.1.  The will of ensuring real accountability of States  
 
All the international tribunals whose control tests are analysed in the previous sections make 
reference to the need of preventing States from escaping responsibility by instructing private 
individuals to carry out acts that would engage their responsibility if carried out by their organs, by 
delegating those functions or by controlling or directing its perpetration by private groups. 
 
The ICJ, the tribunal which puts forward the most demanding control tests in terms of evidence, is 
also aware of this need to ensure accountability of States and makes it clear in its reasoning. 
However, also shows its concern to limit that responsibility to acts over which the State actually had 
direction or control. For this purpose, it advances two tests which are to be applied in a subsidiary 
way: first the strict control test should be applied to decide whether the individuals can be considered 
de facto organs. If this is answered in the negative, the effective control test has to be applied to 
determine whether the specific operations at stake were done under the State’s direction or control. 
The ICJ recognises the need to look beyond the lack of formal recognition of those individuals to 
prevent States escaping responsibility simply by denying their characterisation as organs under 
                                                        
151 See Behrami and Saramati, paras 144-152.  
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internal law: “it is appropriate to look beyond legal status alone, in order to grasp the reality of the 
relationship between the person taking action, and the State to which he is so closely attached to 
appear to be nothing more than its agent: any other solution would allow States to escape their 
international responsibility by choosing to act through persons or entities whose supposed 
independence would be purely fictious”152. However, the Court also pays attention to another 
principle: “so to equate persons or entities with State organs when they do not have that status under 
internal law must be exceptional, for it requires proof of a particularly great degree of State control 
over them [...] complete dependence”153
 
. This consideration explains the high threshold of evidence 
required by the ICJ in both tests.  
 
6.2. The need of limiting attribution only to State’s own conduct 
 
The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY also expresses its awareness of the need to prevent States 
avoiding responsibility in that way, and claims that “generally speaking, it can be maintained that 
the whole body of international law on State responsibility is based on a realistic concept of 
accountability, which disregards legal formalities and aims at ensuring that States entrusting some 
functions to individuals or groups of individuals must answer for their actions, even when they act 
contrary to their directives”154. This last assertion is an analogy with the responsibility of States for 
ultra vires acts of its organs. However, as Gutiérrez Espada has pointed out, this analogy should not be 
done so readily155. In case of de jure organs, the extension of responsibility for ultra vires acts can be 
grounded on their formal characterisation as organs156
                                                        
152 Genocide Convention case (para 392). 
, whose acts are “acts of the State” by virtue of 
that legal characterisation, which is a clear expression of the State consent to those individuals acting 
on its behalf. On the other hand, individuals whose conduct engages State responsibility under 
Article 8 do not enjoy that presumption of acting on behalf of the State by any formal recognition nor 
 
153 Genocide Convention case (para 393). 
 
154 Tádic case (para 121). 
 
155 GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA (2005) p. 104 argues against the readiness in extending by analogy the responsibility of the State 
for ultra vires acts of its organs to cases in which it is proved the existence of instructions or control over individuals 
who have acted beyond those instructions or control asserting: “La tentación es evidente, pero hay un argumento en 
contra: Como regla general los hechos de los órganos son del Estado mientras que en el caso de los particulares ocurre 
precisamente lo contrario”. 
 
156 In cases of de facto organs Talmon argues in favour of the extension of responsibility also to ultra vires acts: “all acts 
committed by the authorities of the secessionist entity in their capacity as de facto organs of the outside power, even 
those ultra vires, are thus attributable to the outside power”; TALMON (2009) p. 501). This extension makes sense in 
regards to de facto organs since the holding of responsibility for all those acts is the logical result of equating them 
with State organs, and the basis for attribution is article 4 ILC Articles, in contrast with cases of responsibility under 
article 8. Article 4 in relation to Article 7 ILC Articles make clear the extension of responsibility for ultra vires acts. 
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by complete control over them, and all efforts have to be placed in the proving of that control or 
direction over the specific operation. This situation is different enough as to limit that extension of 
responsibility. As Gutiérrez Espada points out, the ILC Commentaries give some guidance by 
asserting that “such cases can be resolved by asking whether the unlawful or unauthorised conduct 
was really incidental to the mission or clearly went beyond it”157
 
.  
Not only because of this extension of responsibility in cases of private groups’ conduct contrary to 
instructions, but also due to the lowering of the threshold of control required by the Appeals 
Chamber for the group to engage the international responsibility of the State, the ICJ considers that 
“the overall control test has the major drawback of broadening the scope of state responsibility well beyond the 
fundamental principle governing the law of international responsibility: a State is responsible only for his own 
conduct, that is to say the conduct of persons acting, on whatever basis, on its behalf. [...] the “overall control” 
test is unsuitable, for it stretches too far, almost to breaking point the conduct of a State’s organs and its 
international responsibility”158. The ICJ asserts that the test stretches almost to breaking point the 
relation that must exist between the State organs and its international responsibility for considering 
that the overall control test does not require specific instructions by the organs to the individuals in 
respect of each individual operation in order to assert the responsibility of the State. As Talmon has 
pointed out, the ICTY did not use the overall control test to replace the effective control test “but was, in 
fact, used in lieu of its much more stringent –strict control– test to determine whether a secessionist 
entity qualified as a de facto State organ in the sense of Article 4 [...] It thereby replaced the “strict 
control test with the –overall control– test”159. Hence, the ICJ’s criticism of stretching the relation to 
breaking point is even more so, for the test is used to consider the group as a de facto organ, all whose 
conduct is attributable to the State160
 
. 
The ECtHR applies its own test: the effective overall control test. This involves an important decrease in 
the stringency of the control which has to be proved in order to ascertain the state responsibility, 
since it does not refer anymore to the ability to control or direct the group. Certain control over the 
territory- which need not be detailed- is no guarantee of any relevant level of control over an 
organised group. Thus, the effective overall control test, although it is true that may ensure that States 
avoid responsibility by delegating tasks to a group, and protects the rights granted by the ECHR, it 
does so at the cost of asserting the engagement of State responsibility for acts with whose 
perpetrators there has not been required a sufficiently close control connection, so the  principle of 
only holding the State responsible for its own conduct seems affected. 
                                                        
157 CRAWFORD (2002) p. 113. 
 
158 Genocide Convention case (para 406). 
 
159 TALMON (2009) pp.  506-507. 
 
160 TALMON (2009) p. 510: The same criticism would apply to the effective overall control test used by the ECtHR 
which, as Talmon has indicated “is not used in lieu of the ICJ’s “effective control test buy replaces its –strict control 
test–“. 
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6.3. Responsibility for inciting or failing to prevent a third’s conduct 
 
These problems may be overcome by holding the state responsible for its own conduct in relation to 
the perpetrators. If the evidence of control is not enough to regard the group’s conduct as 
attributable to the State, it still may be sufficient to consider the State responsible for its own conduct 
in relation to the group. It may be the case that the State had the ability, and thus, the responsibility 
to act and prevent the group carrying out those acts. This means asserting responsibility for the 
conduct of its de jure organs in relation to the group, which allows protecting human rights without 
holding the State responsible for conduct which is not clearly established to be its own. As Dixon has 
put it: “irrespective of the question of Attributability, a state may incur primary responsibility 
because of a breach of some other international obligation, even though this obligation arose of the 
situation created by a non-attributable act”161
 
. This is done in Nicaragua v USA, where the ICJ held 
responsible the United States for its own conduct in relation to the contras. The ICJ considered that 
the United States was in breach of the principle of non-intervention, the prohibition of the use of 
force and violation of the sovereignty of Nicaragua. In the Genocide Convention case, the ICJ held 
Serbia and Montenegro responsible for not fulfilling its obligations to prevent and punish genocide. 
This allows overcoming the problems of attribution of conduct to a State. 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
 
7.1. The tendency in international jurisprudence 
 
There seems to be no clear evolution in international jurisprudence in relation to the preferable 
control test to be applied. The ICJ set forward its tests in 1986 in Nicaragua v USA, and later the ICTY 
questioned its persuasiveness in the Tádic case. The ECtHR did not follow the ICJ jurisprudence and 
applied its own test too. However, the ICJ reaffirmed its position and the applicability of its tests in 
2007, in the Genocide Convention case, when it criticised how the overall control test extended the scope 
of responsibility beyond the well- established principle of holding a State responsible for its own 
conduct. Fragmentation seems likely to continue. Nonetheless, as Talmon has suggested “the choice 
of test may have been influenced by a belief that, due to the lack of evidence of –complete 
dependence– or –effective control– over specific activities, the application of the ICJ’s exacting 
control tests would have resulted in the court having to deny, at least in part, its jurisdiction. 
However this was not an inevitable result”162
                                                        
161 DIXON (2007) p. 252. 
.  
 
162 TALMON (2009) p. 512. 
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The ILC Articles do not give an answer to the problem either for they do not specify the level of 
control required for attribution. However, Gutiérrez Espada claims that the ILC has showed its 
preference for the ICJ position in the Commentary to the Articles “al considerar que la –
jurisprudencia Tádic– no se refiere a la misma cuestión que la del TIJ ni, por ende, exactamente al 
tema tratado en el artículo 8. Esta interpretación resulta evidente cuando se manejan los trabajos 
preparatorios y se comprueba la crítica que de la jurisprudencia en este punto del TPIY efectuó el 
Relator Crawford”163
 
.  
Talmon distinguishes “the more principled question of whether there can be several differing control 
tests for the attribution of conduct to a State in the law of State responsibility. It has been suggested 
that the degree of control may vary according to the factual and legal circumstances of the case […] 
This view, however, fails to appreciate that attribution is a concept of a common currency in the 
international law”164
 
 and he shares the view of the ICJ in the Genocide Convention case that the 
requirements cannot differ except in the case of a clear lex especialis.   
 
7.2. The preferable control test 
 
Gutiérrez Espada claims that he understands that the overall control test “cuando las circunstancias 
del caso permiten una prueba inequívoca de su extensión e intensidad (…), puede parecer base 
suficiente para la imputación, y comprendo asimismo que permitiría, como el TPIY ha –visto–, 
ampliar los supuestos de imputación, proteger mejor a las víctimas civiles de los conflictos armados 
[…] pero también entiendo que puede, en un caso dado, ser injusto atribuir a un Estado, que en 
conjunto controla a una persona o grupo de personas, un determinado comportamiento de ésta en 
un incidente puntual que el Estado no dirigió ni controló […] podría considerarse acaso que quien 
ejerce un control general se presume que ejerce el efectivo siempre, y quien afirme lo contrario (pues, 
obsérvese, la presunción sólo es iure tantum) que lo pruebe”165
                                                        
163 GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA (2005) p. 99. 
. I do not share the view that 
presuming the existence of effective control in cases where overall control has been proved is the 
solution to get the right balance. It would merely lead to the application of the overall control test, 
since it may be difficult for a State to prove the lack of instructions over a certain operation, or that 
the instructions were carried out in a way different or beyond its orders. It should be for the 
Applicant State to prove the relation between the group and the respondent State so as to consider 
the first’s conduct attributable to the latter.  In the same sense, Talmon argues that “in order to 
equate the authorities of a secessionist entity with de facto organs of the outside power, the type and 
degree of control must qualitatively be the same as the control a State exercises over its de jure 
 
164 TALMON (2009) pp.  516-517. 
 
165 GUTIÉRREZ ESPADA (2005) p. 100 
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organs, a requirement fulfilled only by the ICJ’s “strict control” test. In the case of authorities of 
secessionist entities not qualifying as de facto organs of the outside power, the degree of control 
must surely be effective control over the wrongful conduct in question, otherwise it is not control”166. 
I share this position, and thus believe that the presumption of effective control in cases of proof of 
overall control is not an appropriate solution. Moreover, I consider this technique not to be necessary 
since the escaping of responsibility can be prevented by holding the state responsible for its own 
conduct in relation to the group. For instance, in the Loizidou case, Talmon argues that “Turkey’s 
responsibility could thus have been engaged not for the acts of the TRNC authorities but for a breach 
of its own due diligence obligations, ie the failure on the part of its own organs present in northern 
Cyprus to prevent violations of the ECHR by the TRNC authorities”167
 
. 
To sum up, the important issue is the effect that each position has and, as it has been set out, denying 
the attribution of a group’s conduct to a State does not necessarily involve denying its responsibility 
in the case. The State can still be held primarily responsible for conduct which is indisputably his 
own in relation to the conduct of the group: for failing to prevent its actions, for inciting them, for 
failing to punish them, or because its acts amounted to a violation of international obligations like 
the prohibition of intervention or the use of force. In this respect, it is important to point out that, 
after having denied attribution of the group’s conduct to the State, in Nicaragua v USA, in the 
Genocide Convention case and the Armed Activities case (in relation to Uganda), the ICJ asserted 
responsibility of the respondent States for their own conduct. This shows that States can be 
prevented to escape international responsibility in these cases and, at the same time, not holding 
them responsible for acts with which there is not a sufficiently clear link as to be considered its own. 
Therefore, I consider that the tests put forward by the ICJ are the ones which best specify the close 
relation that must exist for attributing responsibility to the State for the conduct of private 
individuals, which is exceptional and, at the same time, do not leave victims of human rights or 
humanitarian law violations unprotected since the State may still have “primary responsibility” for 
its own conduct in relation to the group.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
166 TALMON (2009) p. 517. 
 
167 (TALMON (2009) p.512. 
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